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Couples’ Changing Work Patterns
in the United Kingdom and the United States during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Abstract
Going beyond a focus on individual-level employment outcomes, we investigate couples’ 
changing work patterns in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Analyzing longitudinal panels of 2,186 couples from the
Understanding Society COVID-19 Survey (UK) and 2,718 couples from the Current 
Population Survey (US), we assess whether the pandemic has elevated the importance of 
human capital vis-à-vis traditional gender specialization in shaping couples’ work patterns. 
The UK witnessed a notable increase in sole-worker families with the better-educated partner 
working, irrespective of gender. The impact of the pandemic was similar but weaker in the 
US. In both countries, couples at the bottom 25% of the pre-pandemic family income 
distribution experienced the greatest increase in neither partner working but the least growth 
in sole-worker arrangements. Through a couple-level analysis of changing employment 
patterns, this study highlights the importance of human capital in shaping couples’ paid-work 
organization during the pandemic, and it reveals the socioeconomic gradient in such 
organization.
Keywords: Couple, COVID-19, cross-national, gender, human capital, pandemic, work
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1. Introduction
Over the past several decades, there has been a long progress towards gender equality in the 
public sphere across many countries (England et al., 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2018). These
progresses are manifested in the improvement and growing recognition of women’s human 
capital, propelled by a gender-gap reversal in education and a rise in female labor force 
participation (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013; England et al., 2020). However, the COVID-19 
pandemic has fundamentally reshuffled the gendered organization of work in many countries. 
Emerging evidence shows that the pandemic has disproportionately hindered women’s and
particularly mothers’ participation in paid work (e.g., Churchill, 2020; Collins et al., 2020; 
Dias et al., 2020; Qian & Fuller, 2020). The exacerbation of gender inequality in employment 
in the wake of COVID-19 thus instills a looming fear that the pandemic may undo decades of 
progress for women’s equality.
Gendered work arrangements and responses to the pandemic are often devised at a
family level, which involve negotiation, strategic coordination, and sometimes compromise 
without choice between partners (Becker & Moen, 1999; Killewald & García-Manglano, 
2016). This is particularly the case during the pandemic when many countries have taken the 
family as a basic unit of crisis governance (Public Health England, 2020). Coresident family 
members weather the storm and face the consequences of the pandemic together, especially
during lockdowns (Biroli et al., 2020; Prime et al., 2020). Existing research on individual-
level outcomes has provided important evidence on pandemic-related gender inequalities in 
employment (e.g., Churchill, 2020; Collins et al., 2020; Dias et al., 2020; Qian & Fuller, 
2020). However, we still know little about how couples’ paid-work patterns have changed
during the pandemic—an important gap we aim to fill in this article. 
A couple-level approach to assessing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
partners’ paid-work organization promises to yield new, important insights into the question 
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of whether and when human capital trumps traditional gender specialization (Becker, 1991). 
The relationship between gender specialization and human capital features a central place in 
scholarship and public debates on gender and work (Bittman et al., 2003; Killewald & 
Gough, 2013). Against the backdrop of a growing female advantage in educational attainment
(DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013), the puzzle remains as to why families still often stick to 
traditional gender scripts and prioritize men’s employment. As the pandemic poses a severe 
challenge to the economic subsistence of many families, it provides a unique opportunity to
examine couples’ organization of work: In the face of an unprecedented economic strain, do 
couples’ work patterns change in ways that center on maximizing the economic returns to 
human capital or reinforcing traditional gendered divisions of paid labor?
This study contributes to a nascent body of cross-national research that jointly 
considers gender, work, and social class, by extending it to a pandemic setting (Hook, 2015; 
Musick et al., 2020). Specifically, our empirical analysis draws on comparative data from two 
liberal welfare regimes, as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990): the United Kingdom (the 
Understanding Society COVID-19 Survey) and the United States (the Current Population 
Survey). Exploiting the panel design of these surveys, we use couple-level fixed-effects 
models to chart changes and continuity in couples’ work patterns between January–February 
2020 (before the COVID-19 pandemic) and April–May 2020 (during the pandemic). To 
investigate the interplay between human capital and gender specialization, we examine 
whether the impact of the pandemic on couples’ work patterns differs by the educational 
pairing of partners. As the ability of and necessity for couples to maximize economic returns 
to human capital during the pandemic vary with families’ socioeconomic positions, we also 
explore the ways in which changes in couples’ work patterns differ by their earning power as 
reflected in their family income level before the pandemic. 
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2. Gender, Human Capital, and Household Specialization in the Pandemic
In A Treatise on the Family, Becker (1991) conceptualized the family as an economic 
institution. In this institution, partners are cooperative social actors who pursue a joint goal of 
maximizing the economic utility of the couple unit (Becker, 1991). To do so, they 
strategically coordinate and divide paid and unpaid work to specialize in the type of labor one 
is “best at” (Killewald & Gough, 2013). According to the economic model of household 
specialization, the partner with greater earning power usually spends more time on paid work
so as to maximize the economic return to their human capital (Beck, 1991). Human capital is 
typically defined as individuals’ skills and knowledge—a resource that can be used to 
generate economic returns in the labor market (Becker, 1993). According to Becker and 
Moen (1991), education is a key proxy for human capital and income is a key measure of 
returns to human capital (see also Becker, 1993), which we follow in this research. 
However, decades of gender research have shown that economic rationality does not 
always prevail. Rather, the normative conception of gender roles shapes couples’ work 
arrangements in ways that prioritize men’s employment over that of women, irrespective of
partners’ human capital (Bittman et al., 2003; Cha, 2010). Predicated on the stereotypical 
links between femininity and homemaking/caregiving and between masculinity and
breadwinning (Fitzsimons, 2017), the notion of gender specialization posits that persisting 
patriarchal order, rather than economic rationalization, plays a prominent role in determining
couple-level paid-work arrangements (Killewald & Gough, 2013).
The two contesting theoretical perspectives—namely, human capital versus gender
specialization—have attracted sustained scholarly attention (Bittman et al., 2003; Killewald 
& García-Manglano, 2016). Particularly, given the rise of women in education and 
employment over the past decades (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013; England et al., 2020), 
existing evidence presents a puzzle: Despite an increase in women’s human capital, the 
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gendered organization of work still often prioritizes men’s paid work over that of women 
(Fitzsimons, 2017). Some scholars attribute this paradox to a persisting gender wage gap, 
which means the conversion rate of returns to human capital is lower for women (Lips, 
2013). Others suggest that despite the prevalence of dual-earner families, male-breadwinning 
norms continue to anchor women in homemaking and caregiving roles and marginalize the 
female-breadwinning model as culturally “deviant” (Blom & Hewitt, 2019).
The COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent lockdown measures present a unique and 
potentially fruitful context for re-examining whether human capital trumps gender
specialization in couples’ paid-work arrangements. On the one hand, as the global economy 
plunges into an abrupt, unprecedented decline, the resultant mass unemployment jeopardizes
the economic wellbeing of many families (Cocco et al., 2020; Hu 2020). Therefore,
prioritizing human capital over traditional gender roles may be less of a choice but rather a 
necessity as couples work to maintain their economic subsistence (Carr & Springer, 2010). 
On the other hand, however, events such as school closure as well as the lengthened time 
people spend at home during pandemic lockdowns may increase domestic and care demands, 
often in a gendered way (Hjálmsdóttir & Bjarnadóttir, 2020). In turn, greater domestic and 
care demands may reinforce traditional gender specialization and hold women back from 
paid-work participation (Collins et al., 2020; Dias et al., 2020).
Early evidence depicts a clear pattern of human capital stratification in paid-work 
participation and unemployment during the pandemic. Specifically, low-skilled service and 
manual jobs that require lower levels of human capital have been hit hardest by the pandemic 
(Kochharn, 2020; Qian & Fuller, 2020). In contrast, workers with a greater command of 
human capital are less likely to cut back on or lose their work, as many of them have jobs that 
can be performed remotely (Kramer & Kramer, 2020). As a result, plummeting employment 
rates during the pandemic are largely driven by mass layoffs as opposed to workers quitting 
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their jobs (Dias et al., 2020). This means that prioritizing human capital over gender
specialization in couples’ paid-work arrangements may not only be a matter of choice; it may
also represent a selection mechanism imposed by the pandemic that favors human capital and 
eliminates low-skilled workers from the labor force.
The interplay between human capital and couples’ work patterns during the pandemic
may vary with families’ socioeconomic position. As individual earning power tends to be low 
in low-income families (Checchi, 2006), adult members of these families, irrespective of 
gender, often need all hands on the deck to make ends meet. By contrast, members of affluent 
families tend to have greater earning power, which means that one partner’s income alone 
may suffice for the family to maintain a decent standard of living (Parpart & Stichter, 2016). 
In this case, it is financially viable for relatively well-off families to scale back from a dual-
worker model to a sole-worker model during the pandemic, in order to strike a balance 
between maintaining their livelihood, minimizing potential health risks, and responding to 
increasing domestic and care demands. 
We also explore potential cross-national differences between the UK and the US. The 
two countries make a worthy pair of comparison due to similarities in their welfare regimes
but different national responses to the pandemic. As both the UK and the US are liberal-
regime countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990), the comparison provides an opportunity to assess
whether the pandemic’s impact on couples’ work patterns are to some extent generalizable 
across countries of the same welfare regime type. The similar welfare regimes also enable us 
to explore potential differences resulting from distinct responses to the pandemic between the 
two countries. While the UK government implemented a strict national lockdown starting 
from March 23rd, the stay-at-home order was implemented in a less comprehensive, less 
strict, and state-by-state manner in the US (Our World in Data, 2020). In the UK, the national 
lockdown involved a near-complete closure of service and hospitality industries (e.g., bars, 
Author Accepted Manuscript | 9
restaurants, and hotels), whereas no similar blanket policy of business closure was 
implemented in the US. Given the UK’s tighter enforcement of lockdown policies, low-
skilled workers in the UK who were grounded in their homes may be more likely to be 
excluded from the labor force than their US counterparts who were, to a lesser extent, obliged 
by law to stay home.
Although we do not develop formal hypotheses, the above theoretical considerations 
direct inquiry into several pertinent questions: 
1) How have couples’ work patterns changed during the pandemic, compared with 
before the pandemic? 
2) Has the pandemic elevated the importance of human capital vis-à-vis gender
specialization in shaping couples’ work patterns? 
3) How do changes in couples’ work patterns vary with family socioeconomic position? 
3. Data and Methods
3.1.Data
Our UK data are from the Understanding Society (USOC) COVID-19 Survey and the 
preceding Wave 9 of USOC. Initiated in 2009, USOC is a nationally-representative,
longitudinal household survey (McFall, 2012). During the UK’s national lockdown, the 
USOC COVID-19 Survey collected data from 17,452 respondents in April and 14,811 
respondents in May. The survey also asked about respondents’ work and family situations in 
January and February 2020, which we use to establish a pre-pandemic baseline. Our US data 
come from the 2019–2020 Current Population Survey (CPS), obtained from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (https://cps.ipums.org/cps/). The CPS is a monthly household 
survey on the US labor force, with a rotating design: Household members are surveyed in 
four consecutive months, left out of the sample for the following eight months, and then re-
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interviewed in the following four months. While monthly CPS data do not contain income 
information, we obtain information on pre-pandemic family income from the CPS Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) fielded in March 2019. The panel design of the
USOC and the CPS allows us to link data on both members of a couple across time to 
examine couples’ work patterns before and during the pandemic (Flood & Pacas, 2017).
3.2.Analytical Sample
We first limit our sample to married and cohabiting couples in which both partners’ 
information was available immediately before the pandemic (January and/or February 2020), 
during the pandemic (April and/or May 2020), and in the earlier wave of the surveys (i.e., 
USOC Wave 9 and 2019 CPS ASEC). After we construct couple-level longitudinal data, we 
restrict our sample to working-age different-sex couples in which both partners were aged 
25–59 years in 2020.1 After eliminating a small number of UK cases with missing values (< 
10% of the original samples),2 our UK sample includes 5,835 couple-months (2,186 couples) 
and our US sample includes 6,711 couple-months (2,718 couples). Note that USOC Wave 9 
and the 2019 CPS ASEC do not contribute to our couple-month observations but are used to 
obtain data on pre-pandemic family income. Couples’ work patterns may be affected by the 
presence of young children at home. In online supplemental tables, we replicated all analyses 
by limiting our sample to parents of children aged 0–15, which yielded substantively similar 
results. We thus present our results from the more inclusive sample, the characteristics of 
which can be found in Appendix 1. 
1 The average age for our analytical sample is 44 years for women and 46 years for men in the UK, and the 
respective figures are 42 and 44 in the US.
2 Little’s missing completely at random (MCAR) test showed that the missing values were MCAR (Li, 2013). 
Author Accepted Manuscript | 11
3.3.Variables
Our dependent variable is a time-varying measure of couples’ work patterns. To create this 
variable, we first classify respondents into four employment categories based on their weekly 
work hours (Killewald & Zhuo, 2019):3 (1) no work, (2) 1–19 hours (marginally employed), 
(3) 20–34 hours (part-time), and (4) 35 hours or more (full-time). Next, we compare the male 
and female partners’ employment categories to measure couples’ work patterns: neither 
partner worked (both [1]; denoted as “both no work” in tables and figures), dual worker (both 
partners in the same non-zero hour category), male sole worker ([1] for the female partner, 
[2], [3] or [4] for the male partner), male main worker (both non-zero work hours, but the 
male partner worked more hours than the female partner), and female main/sole worker (the 
female partner worked more hours than the male partner; hereafter referred to as “female 
main worker”). We combined “female main worker” and “female sole worker” because of 
their small sample sizes. We created a dummy variable for each of the five categories. 
Our key predictor is a time indicator distinguishing the periods immediately before 
the pandemic (February)4 and during the pandemic (April–May). Moreover, we consider two 
time-invariant moderators. The first moderator measures partners’ educational pairing as a 
proxy for their relative (and absolute) human capital: neither partner is highly educated, 
highly-educated male partner only, highly-educated female partner only, and two highly-
educated partners. Our definition of “highly-educated” is context-specific. It refers to people
with at least a bachelor’s degree in the US and those with any tertiary degree in the UK. In 
the US, college graduates are more likely than those with less education to have the option to 
telework and less likely to become unemployed during the pandemic (Kochharn, 2020). In 
3 In USOC, respondents were asked to report their average weekly work hours in January–February, April, and 
May 2020, respectively. The CPS asked respondents to report their work hours during the previous week.   
4 Hereafter, we use “February” to refer to January–February for the UK sample.
Author Accepted Manuscript | 12
the UK, a tertiary degree is salient in shaping people’s labor market opportunities and 
outcomes (Belfield et al., 2018). Consistent with prior research showing the gender-gap 
reversal in education in the UK and the US (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013; Van Bavel et al., 
2018), we find that in both countries, if only one partner is highly educated, it is more likely 
to be the female, as opposed to the male, partner (Appendix 1). Our second moderator—pre-
pandemic family income level—is derived from the quartiles of family income in each 
country, based on which we group couples into three categories: bottom 25%, middle 50%, 
and top 25%.
3.4.Analytical Strategy
Our couple-level analysis is characterized by three key features: (1) our unit of analysis is the 
couple (as opposed to individuals); (2) our variables are measured at the couple level, which  
account for both partners’ attributes; and (3) we run couple-level fixed effects linear 
probability regression models predicting each category of couples’ work arrangements (for a 
similar approach, see Musick et al. 2020). A couple-level fixed effects regression model
effectively captures within-couple change in work patterns by controlling for couples’ time-
invariant attributes (both observed and unobserved) that may shape partners’ paid-work 
participation (Winship & Morgan, 1999).
We fit all models separately by country. Our first set of models include only the time-
varying pandemic indicator. The coefficient for the pandemic indicator shows how couples’ 
work patterns changed between February (prior to the pandemic) and April–May (during the 
pandemic). Our second set of models include the main effect of the pandemic indicator and 
its interactions with partners’ educational pairings, omitting time-invariant main effects of 
educational pairings from the model. Our third set of models include the main effect of the 
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pandemic indicator and its interactions with pre-pandemic family income levels.5 To aid the
interpretation of our findings, we graph the predicted probabilities of couples’ work patterns.
4. Results
Figure 1 presents couples’ work patterns before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, and full 
model results are presented in Appendix 2. Although the magnitude of changes differed 
between the UK and the US, similar patterns are observed. For example, both countries 
witnessed an increase in the arrangement where neither partner worked. While both countries 
witnessed an increase in the sole-worker model, the prevalence of dual-worker and male-
main-worker models declined. Figure 1 also suggests that changes in couples’ work patterns 
tended to be greater in the UK than in the US. For example, the prevalence of couples in 
which neither partner worked increased five-fold from 3% to 15% in the UK but increased 
just over twofold from 5% to 11% in the US. The likelihood of the female-main-worker 
model doubled from 9% to 20% in the UK, but it only changed slightly in the US from 10%
to 13%. These cross-national differences might have resulted from the stricter lockdown 
measures enforced in the UK than the US.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
How do changes in couples’ work patterns vary with partners’ educational pairings? 
Figure 2 presents couples’ work patterns by educational pairing and country before and 
during the pandemic (see Appendix 3 for full model results). An increase in the prevalence of 
couples in which neither partner worked was seen across the board, regardless of country and 
educational pairing, suggesting the widespread negative impact of the pandemic on 
employment. However, an educational gradient was evident in both countries. The increase in 
5 Due to small cell size, we were not able to examine the three-way interactions between time, educational 
pairing, and family income level. 
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the prevalence of couples in which neither partner worked was most pronounced among 
couples with two less-educated partners (from 5% to 26% in the UK and from 6% to 17% in 
the US), but least prominent among couples with two highly-educated partners (from 2% to 
6% in the UK and from 3% to 5% in the US).
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
An increase in the sole-worker model was evident in both countries, but the increase 
was uneven across distinct educational pairings. Our findings seem to support the contention
that human capital trumped gender, especially in the UK. Specifically, the probability of the 
male-sole-worker model increased the most among couples with a highly-educated male 
partner but a less-educated female partner, from 17% to 32% (by 15-percentage-points) in the 
UK and from 27% to 36% (by 9-percentage-points) in the US. By contrast, among other 
educational pairings, the probability of the male-sole-worker model increased by less than
10-percentage-points in the UK and about 6-percentage-points in the US. Meanwhile, the 
probability of the female-main-worker model increased the most among couples with a 
highly-educated female partner but a less-educated male partner, from 10% to 26% (by 16-
percentage-points) in the UK and from 15% to 22% (by 7-percentage-points) in the US, but 
increased the least among couples with a highly-educated male partner only (from 11% to 
14% in the UK and from 9% to 10% in the US).
In sum, our results suggest that in both the UK and the US, human capital played a 
more prominent role than gender specialization in shaping changes in couples’ work patterns 
during the pandemic. The increase in the proportion of couples in which neither partner
worked concentrated in the lower-end of the human capital spectrum, namely among couples 
with two less-educated partners. Meanwhile, the increase in the male-sole-worker model was 
greatest among couples with a better-educated male partner, whereas the increase in families 
with women as the sole or primary worker was greatest among couples with a better-educated 
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female partner. In other words, if two partners differed in educational attainment, human 
capital seems to have trumped traditional gender roles to shape couples’ work patterns during
the pandemic.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Figure 3 depicts the ways in which the impact of the pandemic on couples’ work 
patterns vary with pre-pandemic family income level (see Appendix 4 for full model results).
In line with the results for educational pairing, the increase in the prevalence of couples in 
which neither partner worked was most pronounced among low-income families. For families 
in the bottom income quartile, the probability of neither partner working increased from 7%
to 28% in the UK and from 9% to 21% in the US. For the middle 50% of families, the 
probability increased to a smaller degree, from 1% to 12% in the UK and from 4% to 9% in 
the US. For the top 25% of families, the increase was the smallest, only from 1% to 6% in the 
UK and from 2% to 4% in the US. These results suggest that the pandemic may have 
exacerbated pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities. 
Despite an overall increase in the male-sole-worker model during the pandemic, the 
increase was hardly seen in the bottom income quartile and was mainly seen in the 75% of 
better-off couples. In the UK, the probability of the male-sole-worker model increased only
from 27% to 30% in the bottom income quartile, but nearly doubled among the middle 50% 
of couples (from 13% to 23%) and also in the top income quartile (from 12% to 22%).
Similarly, in the US, the probability hardly changed in the bottom quartile (from 40% to 
39%), but it increased from 18% to 28% in the middle two quartiles and from 16% to 24% in 
the top quartile. 
The increase in the female-main-worker model was also more limited among low-
income families than better-off families. In the UK, an 8-percentage-point increase in the 
female-main-worker model was noted in the bottom income quartile, compared to an increase
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by 12 and 11 percentage points in the middle and top quartiles, respectively. In the US, the 
prevalence of the female-main-worker model hardly changed among couples at the bottom of 
the family income distribution, compared to a 4-percentage-point increase in the middle two 
quartiles and a 3-percentage-point increase in the top quartile. These results suggest that 
couples’ work patterns during the pandemic was shaped by their socioeconomic position. 
5. Conclusions and Discussion
Recent research focusing on individual-level outcomes has revealed widening gender 
inequalities in work hours and employment during the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., Churchill, 
2020; Collins et al., 2020; Dias et al., 2020; Qian & Fuller, 2020). Extending existing 
research, this study is the first to offer cross-national evidence on changes and continuity in 
couples’ work patterns during the pandemic. In so doing, our findings make several important
contributions to understanding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the gendered
organization of work and employment.
Adding to the literature on household and feminist economics (Becker, 1991; Molina, 
2011), our findings suggest that human capital rather than gender specialization has come to 
play a more prominent role in shaping couples’ paid-work patterns in the wake of the 
pandemic. During the pandemic, we have seen a substantial increase in the proportion of 
sole-worker families in which the better-educated partner, irrespective of gender, participated 
in paid work. This is especially true in the UK where the lockdown measures were more 
comprehensively and stringently enforced than in the US. The rise of labor specialization 
predicated on human capital as opposed to traditional gender roles may be a combined result 
of couples’ proactive attempt to maximize economic returns to their human capital and the 
protective role of human capital in keeping skilled professionals in tele-communicable work. 
While emerging evidence on the gendered impact of COVID-19 on individuals’ employment 
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instills a sense of fear that the pandemic may undo decades of progress toward gender 
equality (Collins et al., 2020; Qian & Fuller, 2020), our findings ignite a glimmer of hope that 
the pandemic may have created a condition in which human capital trumps traditional gender
roles and thus a catalyst for achieving greater gender equality.
The impact of the pandemic on couples’ work patterns varies across the 
socioeconomic strata. We find that compared to their more affluent and better-educated 
counterparts, couples at the bottom of the (pre-pandemic) family income distribution and 
couples in which neither partner was highly-educated experienced a more dramatic increase 
in the situation where neither partner worked. This is especially true in the UK, perhaps due 
to the country’s more stringent lockdown and business closure policies than the US. This 
result suggests that the pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities. It 
remains to be seen whether couples in the bottom socioeconomic stratum were only 
temporarily out of work by tracing their long-term trajectory of economic recovery. To aid 
equitable post-pandemic recovery, it would be crucial for governments and employers to 
attend to the employment needs of low-income and less-educated couples. We also found that
the increase of sole-earner couples during the pandemic was much greater among affluent 
than low-income families. In fact, there was hardly any increase in the prevalence of sole-
worker families in the bottom income quartile. As a result, low-income couples were less 
likely to have moved towards greater gender specialization in paid work during the pandemic. 
This could be because low-income couples tended to command lower levels of individual 
human capital and earning power, which meant that both partners needed to participate in 
paid work, whenever they could, in order to make ends meet. 
Given the quantitative nature of our study, we were unable to identity the specific 
mechanisms underpinning couples’ changing work patterns. The observed changes may be a
combined result of couples’ negotiation or strategic coordination to maximize family well-
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being and couples’ compromise without choice in light of mass layoffs amid business 
shutdowns and organizational downsizing. Further qualitative research is needed to more 
fully unpack the nuanced explanations for couples’ changing work patterns during COVID-
19. Meanwhile, given our focus on couples’ paid-work patterns, the question remains as to
whether and how changing work arrangements have evolved in tandem with couples’
divisions of household and care work. Future data collection and analysis could usefully 
examine the work–family interface. Such a focus will help ascertain whether the rising 
importance of human capital in couples’ employment arrangements during the pandemic has 
led to greater gender equality in the division of unpaid labor or an intensified work–family
double-bind for educated professional women who remained in work. Moreover, with a focus 
on the immediate impact of the pandemic, we are not able to determine whether the observed 
changes may persist or cascade into further changes in the long run. 
We have made a first attempt to conduct a comparative study of the pandemic’s 
impact on couples’ work patterns, although we are unable to systematically explain 
differences and similarities between the UK and the US. First, we find that the patterns of 
change in couples’ work patterns were similar between the two countries, suggesting the 
diffuse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic beyond the confine of specific nation-states. As 
both the UK and the US are liberal-regime states, our observed similarities between the two 
countries suggest that the pandemic’s impact on couples’ paid-work patterns may apply to a 
broader range of countries adopting a liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Future 
research could usefully expand our scope to examine the interplay between human capital
and gender specialization in reshaping couples’ work patterns in other types of welfare 
regimes (e.g., conservative regimes, social democratic regimes). Second, the magnitude of 
change in couples’ work patterns appeared to be greater in the UK than in the US, suggesting 
that governmental responses to COVID-19 may have shaped couple-level adaptions, coping 
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strategies, and consequences. As social scientists are collecting comparable data across a 
wide range of countries adopting diverse pandemic mitigation measures, it would be fruitful 
to more systemically explain cross-national similarities and differences in the pandemic’s 
impacts on couples’ work patterns, when such data become available.
While most research so far has focused exclusively on the labor market implications 
of the COVID-19 pandemic for individual workers (e.g., Churchill, 2020; Collins et al., 2020; 
Dias et al., 2020; Qian & Fuller, 2020), we have taken a couple-level approach to advance 
our understanding of the social and economic impacts of the pandemic. Focusing on couples’ 
work patterns, this study acknowledges that gendered patterns of paid work are constructed 
jointly between partners (Killewald & García-Manglano, 2016; Musick et al., 2020). Our 
couple-level analysis underlines the fact that people often weather and coordinate their 
responses to the pandemic as a family. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the impact of the 
pandemic on family collectives rather than individuals.
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FIGURE 1   Couples’ work patterns before and during the COVID-19 pandemic (February 
and April–May), by country
Note: Predicted probabilities based on couple fixed-effects models. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. See Appendix 2 for full model results. 
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FIGURE 2   Couples’ work patterns before and during the COVID-19 pandemic (February 
and April–May), by educational pairing and country
Note: HE = Highly educated. Predicted probabilities based on couple fixed-effects models. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals. See Appendix 3 for full model results. 
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FIGURE 3   Couples’ work patterns before and during the COVID-19 pandemic (February 
and April–May), by pre-pandemic family income level and country
Note: Predicted probabilities based on couple fixed-effects models. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. See Appendix 4 for full model results. 
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APPENDIX 1   Sample characteristics
Variable UK (%) US (%)
Couple-month level
April–May (during the pandemic) 62.5 59.5
Couple’s work patterns before the pandemic
Both no work 2.7 4.7
Dual worker 35.4 48.1
Male sole worker 16.3 23.0
Male main worker 35.8 13.9
Female main worker 9.8 10.4
Couples’ work patterns during the pandemic
Both no work 14.5 10.6
Dual worker 21.2 34.6
Male sole worker 24.2 29.9
Male main worker 20.4 11.4
Female main worker 19.7 13.5
Couple level
Educational pairing
Neither partner highly educated 28.2 44.4
Male highly educated only 14.7 9.0
Female highly educated only 21.8 14.8
Both partners highly educated 35.3 31.8
Pre-pandemic family income level
Bottom 25% 25.0 24.9
Middle 50% 50.0 50.1
Top 50% 25.0 25.0
N (couple–month) 5,835 6,711
N (couple) 2,186 2,718
Note: Column percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Unweighted statistics. 
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APPENDIX 2   Couple fixed-effects models predicting couples’ work patterns, by country
Predictors UK US UK–US difference (p)
Both no work




Adjusted R2 0.66 0.70
Dual worker




Adjusted R2 0.73 0.76
Male sole worker




Adjusted R2 0.69 0.78
Male main worker




Adjusted R2 0.68 0.67
Female main worker




Adjusted R2 0.67 0.70
N (couple–month) 5,835 6,711
N (couple) 2,186 2,718
Note: Ref. = Reference category. ns = not statistically significant at the 10% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Linear probability models. Underlying models for Figure 1.
* p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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APPENDIX 3  Couple fixed-effects models predicting couples’ work patterns, by educational pairing and country
Neither HE UK–US 
diff. (p)
Male HE UK–US 
diff. (p)
Female HE UK–US 
diff. (p)
Both HE UK–US 
diff. (p)Predictors UK US UK US UK US UK US
Both no work
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.21*** 0.10*** < 0.001 0.13*** 0.06*** < 0.01 0.11*** 0.05*** < 0.001 0.05*** 0.01* < 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.71 0.61 0.72 0.62 0.68 0.69 0.69
Dual worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.15*** –0.15*** ns –0.11*** –0.10*** ns –0.19*** –0.18*** ns –0.14*** –0.12*** ns
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.31*** 0.41*** 0.29*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.58*** 0.40*** 0.56***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.77
Male sole worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.05** 0.07*** ns 0.15*** 0.09*** < 0.05 0.07*** 0.06*** ns 0.09*** 0.06*** < 0.10
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.17*** 0.27*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.82
Male main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.21*** –0.03*** < 0.001 –0.20*** –0.06** < 0.001 –0.14*** –0.00 < 0.001 –0.10*** –0.01 < 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.37*** 0.13*** 0.40*** 0.19*** 0.34*** 0.12*** 0.34*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.63 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69
Female main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.10*** 0.01 < 0.001 0.03 0.01 ns 0.16*** 0.07*** < 0.001 0.11*** 0.05*** < 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.69 0.69
N (couple–month) 1,652 2,972 869 599 1,253 898 2,061 2,151
N (couple) 616 1,208 321 244 477 402 772 864
Note: HE = Highly educated. Ref. = Reference category. Feb. = February. Diff. = Difference. ns = not statistically significant at the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Linear probability models. Underlying models for Figure 2.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
Author Accepted Manuscript | 31
APPENDIX 4  Couple fixed-effects models predicting couples’ work patterns, by pre-pandemic family income level and country
Bottom 25% UK–US 
difference (p)
Middle 50% UK–US 
difference (p)
Top 25% UK–US 
difference (p)Predictors UK US UK US UK US
Both no work
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.21*** 0.13*** < 0.001 0.11*** 0.05*** < 0.001 0.05*** 0.02* < 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.71 0.61 0.71 0.65 0.61
Dual worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.10*** –0.09*** ns –0.18*** –0.18*** ns –0.14*** –0.10*** < 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.39*** 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.60***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.77
Male sole worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.03 –0.01 < 0.10 0.10*** 0.11*** ns 0.10*** 0.07*** ns
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.16***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.78 0.69 0.76 0.73 0.81
Male main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.21*** –0.03** < 0.001 –0.15*** –0.02* < 0.001 –0.11*** –0.02 < 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.34*** 0.12*** 0.37*** 0.15*** 0.35*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.64 0.70
Female main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.08*** 0.00 < 0.001 0.12*** 0.04*** < 0.001 0.11*** 0.03** < 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.71
N (couple–month) 1,443 1,675 2,993 3,355 1,459 1,681
N (couple) 547 677 1,093 1,361 546 680
Note: Ref. = Reference category. Feb. = February. Standard errors in parentheses. ns = not statistically significant at the 10% level. Linear probability models. Underlying 
models for Figure 3.




Couples’ Changing Work Patterns
in the United Kingdom and the United States during the COVID-19 Pandemic
(Limiting sample to parents with children age 0–15 in household)
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE S1. Couple fixed-effects models predicting couples’ work 
patterns, by country
Predictors UK US UK–US difference (p)
Both no work




Adjusted R2 0.62 0.67
Dual worker




Adjusted R2 0.73 0.76
Male sole worker




Adjusted R2 0.69 0.79
Male main worker




Adjusted R2 0.68 0.67
Female main worker




Adjusted R2 0.67 0.70
N (couple–month) 3,199 3,600
N (couple) 1,218 1,460
Note: Ref. = Reference category. ns = not statistically significant at the 10% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Linear probability models. 
* p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
S2
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE S2. Couple fixed-effects models predicting couples’ work patterns, by educational pairing and country
Neither HE UK–US 
diff. (p)
Male HE UK–US 
diff. (p)
Female HE UK–US 
diff. (p)
Both HE UK–US 
diff. (p)Predictors UK US UK US UK US UK US
Both no work
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.22*** 0.12*** < 0.001 0.11*** 0.06** ns 0.10*** 0.05*** < 0.05 0.05*** 0.02 < 0.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.03* 0.05*** 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.71 0.57 0.72 0.63 0.68 0.60 0.69
Dual worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.10*** –0.14*** ns –0.07** –0.11** ns –0.17*** –0.21*** ns –0.14*** –0.13*** ns
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.24*** 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.58*** 0.36*** 0.53***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.82 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.77
Male sole worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.03 0.06*** ns 0.19*** 0.12*** ns 0.09*** 0.04 ns 0.11*** 0.08*** ns
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.25*** 0.35*** 0.19*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.82
Male main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.23*** –0.05*** < 0.001 –0.28*** –0.10** < 0.001 –0.17*** 0.01 < 0.001 –0.13*** –0.01 < 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.40*** 0.15*** 0.49*** 0.28*** 0.40*** 0.17*** 0.43*** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.63 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.69
Female main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.08*** 0.00 < 0.001 0.06** 0.03 ns 0.15*** 0.11*** ns 0.10*** 0.05*** < 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.04** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.64 0.69
N (couple–month) 796 1,489 472 281 724 508 1,207 1,322
N (couple) 304 606 177 114 280 204 457 536
Note: HE = Highly educated. Ref. = Reference category. Feb. = February. Diff. = Difference. ns = not statistically significant at the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Linear probability models.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
S3
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE S3. Couple fixed-effects models predicting couples’ work patterns, by pre-pandemic family income level and 
country
Bottom 25% UK–US 
difference (p)
Middle 50% UK–US 
difference (p)
Top 25% UK–US 
difference (p)Predictors UK US UK US UK US
Both no work
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.22*** 0.14*** < 0.01 0.09*** 0.05*** < 0.01 0.03** 0.03* < 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.04* 0.06*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.02*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.69 0.62 0.67 0.55 0.54
Dual worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.07*** –0.08*** ns –0.15*** –0.18*** ns –0.13*** –0.13*** ns
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.58***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.72 0.76
Male sole worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.03 –0.01 ns 0.13*** 0.11*** ns 0.11*** 0.08*** ns
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.31*** 0.45*** 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.80 0.70 0.76 0.72 0.80
Male main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) –0.26*** –0.05** < 0.001 –0.18*** –0.03 < 0.001 –0.12*** –0.02 < 0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.39*** 0.14*** 0.45*** 0.19*** 0.41*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.71 0.71
Female main worker
April–May (ref. = Feb.) 0.08*** 0.01 < 0.01 0.11*** 0.05*** < 0.001 0.11*** 0.05*** < 0.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.75 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.72
N (couple–month) 878 964 1,581 1,756 740 880
N (couple) 341 390 595 715 282 355
Note: Ref. = Reference category. Feb. = February. Standard errors in parentheses. ns = not statistically significant at the 10% level. Linear probability models. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
